

Maritime Cybersecurity: Guidelines and Testbeds

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iTrust @ SUTD



DeST-SCI National Satellite of Excellence Design Science and Technology for Secure Critical Infrastructure



ISSION

Advance the state of the art and practice in the DESIGN of SECURE complex interconnected critical infrastructure



ISION

To be Singapore's one-stop centre for (a) research, training, and analysis and (b) Cyber defence of Critical Infrastructure.

To be the world's leading centre for applied research in Cyber Security in the context of Critical Infrastructure.

World-Class OT Testbeds





Secure Water Treatment (SWaT); 2015 Water Distribution (WADI); 2016 Electric Power & Intelligent Control (EPIC); 2017 CyberX & Internet of Things (IoT); 2016

https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/itrust-labs_overview

International Cyber Exercises

Tactics, Techniques, $\mathbf{0}$ **Procedures**







Red Teaming | Blue Teaming 2016, 2017, 2019 – 2022 Crossed Swords | Locked Shields 2020 – 2022

https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/ciss-2022

Maritime Cybersecurity



You are here: Home > Shipping News > Maritime Cyber Attacks Increase By 900% In Three Years

Maritime Cyber Attacks Increase By 900% In Three Years

By MI News Network | In: Shipping News | Last Updated on July 20, 2020



Cyber-attacks on the maritime industry's operational technology (OT) systems have increased by 900% over the last three years with the number of reported incidents set to reach record volumes by year end.

https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/maritime-cyber-attacks-increaseby-900-in-three-years/



✓ Topics ✓ Government activity Q

<u>Home</u> > <u>Government</u> > <u>Cyber security</u> > <u>Cyber security breaches survey 2022</u>

Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport

Official Statistics

Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2022

Published 30 March 2022

https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2022/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2022

Cyberstar

About us Solutions Blog

03/15/2022

How Bad Was Maritime Cyber Security in 2021? Consider These 8 Incidents



https://www.zkcyberstar.com/2022/03/15/how-bad-was-maritime-cyber-securityin-2021-consider-these-8-incidents/

Cyber Risk Management

- Increasing adoption of ICT in the maritime industry with enhanced monitoring and communication capabilities.
- However, increased connectivity introduces cyber risks.
 - Shipboard OT systems subject to cyber attacks;
 - Disrupt safe operations of a vessel and cause catastrophic consequences.
- Need to establish <u>a guideline for cyber risk management</u> on shipboard OT systems.
 - Ship owners can use it as the recommended best practices for adoption;
 - Maritime authorities can use it to perform vessel inspections.
- Many regulations and industry guidelines on maritime cyber risk mitigation strategies from various sources (e.g. IMO, ABS, BIMCO, DNV, ENISA, ...).
 - The target audience of the existing guidelines are those at the management/decision-making level and operator level.

Singapore <u>lacks its own guideline</u> that can be easily referred to and adopted by maritime authorities and ship owners.

New Guidelines

One-year Study on Cyber Risks of Shipboard Operational Technology (OT) Systems

Deliverables

- □ New guidelines on cyber risk management
- Checklist for authorities and shipowners to conduct cyber risk assessment

Outcomes

- Supported MPA's efforts in developing cyber notation for SRS (Nov 21)
- Info paper in the 105th IMO/MSC meeting, Apr 2022

https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/news-events/news/guidelines-for-cyber-risk-

management-in-shipboard-ot-systems

Guidelines for

Cyber Risk Management in Shipboard Operational Technology Systems




1st Edition Published 22 Feb 2022



New Guidelines: Cyber Risk Assessment

- Better understanding of impact of cyber risks.
- Calculate risk score for each of OT sub-systems using a 4-by-4 risk score matrix.
 - Likelihood: The possibility a cyber incident will occur.
 - Severity: The impact caused by the occurrence of the cyber incident.
 - Risk score = Severity Score x Likelihood Score

| High risk systems | Attack surface | Cyber attack | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| ECDIS | USB ports, NMEA | DoS attack, virus, spoofing | | | | | | | |
| SATCOM, ICS | VSAT modem/system | Phishing emails, unauthorised admin access, FTP access, command-line access | | | | | | | |
| AIS | AIS messages | Spoofing | | | | | | | |
| DPS | GNSS Receiver | DoS attack | | | | | | | |
| GPS | GPS receiver | Spoofing | | | | | | | |
| RADAR | Local ethernet switch | Malware intrusion | | | | | | | |
| CCR | Malicious emails, USB ports | Ransomware, Malware | | | | | | | |
| BWS | Malicious emails, USB ports | Phishing, Malware intrusion | | | | | | | |
| Propulsion, Machinery & Power Control Systems | USB ports | Malware attack | | | | | | | |



Medium

Low


3-9 1-2

New Guidelines: Check List


- Help to do cyber risk assessment.
- Provide actionable list of measures.
- **Tier Security:** the <u>urgency of cyber risks</u> of a ship to be managed.
 - Tier -1 (Risk Score = 12–16): must have for high risks that are most vulnerable and easy to exploit
 - Tier -2 (Risk Score = 3–9): should have for medium risks that are possible for an attacker to exploit
 - Tier -3 (Risk Score = 1–2): good to have for low risks that have less chances being exploited by an attacker

| OT sub-system(s) | Cyber risk checklist | Mitigation checklist | Security tier |
|---|------------------------|--|---------------|
| Satellite Communication System (SATCOM) | Phishing email attempt | T1-13 Antivirus software is installed in the business computer. T1-14 Files and email attachments downloaded from emails are scanned with antivirus software before opening it. T1-15 Crew awareness is established on the following: The crew can distinguish phishing emails from the real ones The crew is aware that emails from unknown sources should be viewed carefully, and suspicious emails should not be opened The crew is aware that they must not click on unknown URLs T1-16 Email security is implemented in Outlook/Gmail – For example, S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose Internet <i>Mail</i> Extension) can be implemented to encrypt the email and ensure authenticity & integrity of the email. | 1 |

Maritime Cybersecurity Testbed



New Testbed: MariOT



- Flexible hybrid platform for multi-scenario simulation
- **Common industry protocols** + open framework to connect & configure different components
- Interfaces for launching attacks and validating new technologies
- **Virtual models** and open cyber-physical interface to overcome physical limitations
- Connection to SUTD's 5G testbed for ship-shore comms security

Cyber attack scenarios from MariOT piped to simulator in crew training

Navigation Simulator @ CEMS, Singapore Polytechnic

Remote link

New Testbed: Components of MariOT

Constant and love and love of the

Navigation Systems

- ECDIS
- RADAR
- BNWAS
- AIS
- GPS
- DPS
- GMDSS
- VDR
- Steering gear system with Rudder

Cargo Management Systems

STATE OF STREET, STREE

- Cargo monitoring system
- Ballast water system
- Ballast water monitoring system

Communication Systems

- Satellite communication system
- Integrated Communication System
- VoIP phone
- Wireless LAN
- 5G network

Propulsion, Machinery & Power control Systems

- Series of generators, motors, propeller (to simulate diesel engine, diesel-electric engine and fully electric engine)
- Engine and fuel monitoring & control system
- Alarm monitoring and control system
- Power management system
- Fire detection and monitoring system

Maritime Cybersecurity Roadmap

| Proposed SUTD roadmap for R&D capability development | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 |
|--|------|------|---------|---------|----------------|----------------------|----------|---------|--------------------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------------|------|------|------|
| Guidelines for Cyber Risk Management in Shipboard OT Systems | | C | omplete | ed | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MariOT testbed: Design and construction of maritime testbed | | | | | elop- phase | | | | Ο | | nal pha ears) | se | | | |
| | | | | Cyber / | Attack S | Simulati | ion (Sh | pboard |) | | | | | | |
| A Digital Twin of Shipboard OT Systems and Security Testing | | | | | (Cybe | r Range | e / Lab) | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Vulnerability Discovery and Security Assessment of Shipboard OT Systems* | | | | | | | R | isk Pro | filing & Ves | | ment o | f | | | |
| 5. New Security Solutions for Shipboard OT Systems* | | | Info | | | /laritime ructure | | | ection (Inform structur | nation | | Secu Offli Back | ine | | |

* Research topics under National Satellite of Excellence (NSoE) Phase II proposal, pending approval by the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA)

Key thrusts under SMI R&D 2030 roadmap for Maritime Cybersecurity

^ Critical Information Infrastructure

Thank You

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